As a result, these calculations of funds were much more appropriate for the individual approach to the agreement. However, due to a lack of time constraints, the practice of Congress was to send each draft budget to a conference committee. However, it is not uncommon for the reports of these committees to have divided some of the various amendments in the Senate.  In this case, first the House of Representatives, and then the Senate, would vote on the conference report and propose a collective solution to most of the bicameral differences on the bill, and then react individually to each of the remaining amendments. The result was to combine the application of both collective and individual approaches to dispute resolution.  In the French case, well analyzed in English by Tsebelis and Money, the process is similar to that of Congress, because a bill passed by one house is then sent to the other, which can in turn propose amendments for the first house to be examined. After the National Assembly and the Senate have twice reacted to a bill (or earlier, if the bill is declared urgent) – the sending process is known in France as shuttle or shuttle – the government can request the creation of a conference committee composed equally of members of both houses. If the Conference Committee proposes a compromise that both Assemblies accept, the legislative process is over. However, if the Conference Committee disagrees or its report is rejected, the government may ask the National Assembly for its responsibility to pass the bill in the final form proposed by the government. In other words, the government and its parliamentary partner, the National Assembly, have the final say if they wish. See George Tsebelis and Jeanette Money, “Bicameral negotiations: the shuttle system in France,” British Journal of Political Science, 25, 1995, 101-29; Jeanette Money and George Tsebelis, “The political power of the French Senate: micromechanisms of bicameral negotiations,” The Journal of Legislative Studies, No.
1, 1995, p. 192-217. Persons who have been guilty of failing to provide the information necessary for collective bargaining and of exercising control over compliance with collective agreements are liable to fines in the manner set out in federal law. The difference between individual and collective approaches may be more formal than real. The individual approach suggests that the two assemblies treat each amendment in isolation from the others, eliminating them on their own and taking into account how they have already eliminated the other amendments or how they intend to eliminate them.